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Problema I

Problema I

172 sentences · 113 notes

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  1. 1

    Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical?

    GivesIsgive · verb, present, indicative, passivemain verb of the sentence
    derthereder · adverb, expletiveexpletive subject of Gives
    enaen · determiner, common gender, singulardeterminer of Suspension
    teleologiskteleologicalteleologisk · adjective, common gender, singularmodifies Suspension
    SuspensionsuspensionSuspension · noun, common gender, singularnotional subject of Gives
    afofaf · prepositionpreposition marking Ethiske
    dettheden · determiner, neuter, singulardeterminer of Ethiske
    EthiskeethicalEthiske · noun, neuter, singularmodifies Suspension
  2. 2

    The ethical as such is the universal, and as the universal that which is valid for everyone, which from another side can be expressed by saying that it is valid at every moment.

  3. 3

    It rests immanently in itself, has nothing outside itself that is its télos, but is itself télos for everything it has outside itself, and once the ethical has taken this up into itself, it goes no further.

  4. 4

    Immediately determined as a sensuous and psychical being, the single individual is the single individual who has his télos in the universal, and this is his ethical task: constantly to express himself in it, to annul his singularity so as to become the universal.

  5. 5

    As soon as the single individual wants to assert himself in his singularity over against the universal, he sins, and only by acknowledging this can he be reconciled again with the universal.

  6. 6

    Every time the single individual, after having entered into the universal, feels an impulse to assert himself as the single individual, he is in spiritual trial, out of which he works his way only by repentantly giving himself up as the single individual within the universal.

  7. 7

    If this is the highest that can be said of man and of his existence, then the ethical has the same character as a man's eternal blessedness, which in all eternity and at every moment is his télos, since it would be a contradiction that it could be given up (that is, teleologically suspended), because the moment it is suspended it is forfeited, whereas what is suspended is not forfeited but precisely preserved in the higher, which is its télos.

  8. 8

    If that is how matters stand, then Hegel is right when he lets man, in the good and in conscience, be determined merely as the single individual; he is right to regard this determination as a 'moral form of evil' (cf. especially the Philosophy of Right), which is to be annulled in the teleology of ethical life, so that the single individual who remains in that stage either sins or lies in spiritual trial. What Hegel has no right to do, on the other hand, is to speak of faith — no right not to protest loudly and clearly that Abraham enjoys honor and glory as a father of faith, when he ought rather to be turned away and cast out as a murderer.

  9. 9

    For faith is precisely this paradox, that the single individual is higher than the universal — yet, mark well, in such a way that the movement repeats itself, so that he, after having been in the universal, now as the single individual isolates himself as higher than the universal.

  10. 10

    If this is not faith, then Abraham is lost, then faith has never existed in the world — precisely because it has always existed.

  11. 11

    For if the ethical — that is, ethical life — is the highest, and there remains nothing incommensurable in man in any other way than that this incommensurable is the evil, that is, the singular that must be expressed in the universal, then one needs no other categories than those Greek philosophy had, or than what can be drawn out of them by consistent thinking.

  12. 12

    This Hegel ought not to have concealed; for he did, after all, have Greek studies behind him.

  13. 13

    Not seldom one hears men who, for lack of losing themselves in study, immerse themselves in phrases, telling us that over the Christian world there shines a light, while a darkness broods over paganism.

  14. 14

    This way of talking has always struck me as strange, since to this day every more thorough thinker, every more serious artist, is rejuvenated by the eternal youth of the Greek people.

  15. 15

    Such a pronouncement can be explained by the fact that one does not know what one is to say, but only that one is to say something.

  16. 16

    It is quite in order to say that paganism did not have faith; but if by that one is supposed to have said something, then one must be a little clearer about what one understands by faith, since otherwise one sinks back into such phrases.

  17. 17

    To explain the whole of existence, faith included, without having any conception of what faith is, is easy; and he does not calculate worst in life who counts on admiration when he has such an explanation — for it is as Boileau says: un sot trouve toujours un plus sot, qui l'admire.

  18. 18

    Faith is precisely this paradox, that the single individual as the single individual is higher than the universal, is justified over against it — not subordinated, but superordinate — yet, mark well, in such a way that it is the single individual who, after having been as the single individual subordinate to the universal, now through the universal becomes the single individual who as the single individual is superordinate to it; that the single individual as the single individual stands in an absolute relation to the absolute.

  19. 19

    This standpoint cannot be mediated; for all mediation takes place precisely by virtue of the universal; it is and remains for all eternity a paradox, inaccessible to thought.

  20. 20

    And yet faith is this paradox — or else (these are the consequences I would ask the reader to keep in mind at every point, even though it would become too long-winded for me to write them out everywhere) — or else faith has never existed, precisely because it has always existed, or else Abraham is lost.

  21. 21

    That this paradox can, for the single individual, easily be confused with a spiritual trial, is true enough; but that is no reason to conceal it.

  22. 22

    That the whole make-up of many people may be such that the paradox repels them is true enough; but that is no reason to make faith into something else in order to be able to have it too, but rather to admit that one does not have it — while those who do have faith ought to be intent on setting up some marks of recognition by which one could distinguish the paradox from a spiritual trial.

  23. 23

    The story of Abraham now contains just such a teleological suspension of the ethical.

  24. 24

    There has been no lack of sharp minds and thorough scholars who have found analogies to it.

  25. 25

    Their wisdom amounts to the fine proposition that at bottom everything is the same.

  26. 26

    When one looks a little more closely, I very much doubt that in the whole world one will find a single analogy, except a later one, which proves nothing, once it stands firm that Abraham represents faith and that faith is normatively expressed in him — whose life is not merely the most paradoxical that can be thought, but so paradoxical that it cannot be thought at all.

  27. 27

    He acts by virtue of the absurd; for it is precisely the absurd that he, as the single individual, is higher than the universal.

  28. 28

    This paradox cannot be mediated; for as soon as he begins to do so, he must admit that he was in a spiritual trial, and if so, he never comes to sacrifice Isaac, or if he has sacrificed Isaac, then he must repentantly return to the universal.

  29. 29

    By virtue of the absurd he gets Isaac back.

  30. 30

    Abraham is therefore at no moment a tragic hero, but something altogether different — either a murderer or a believer.

  31. 31

    The intermediate determination that saves the tragic hero, Abraham does not have.

  32. 32

    That is why I can understand a tragic hero, but cannot understand Abraham, even though in a certain insane sense I admire him more than all others.

  33. 33

    Abraham's relation to Isaac is, ethically expressed, quite simply this: that the father shall love the son more than himself.

  34. 34

    Yet the ethical, within its own compass, has several gradations; we shall see whether in this story there is to be found any such higher expression of the ethical that could ethically explain his conduct, ethically justify him in suspending the ethical obligation toward the son, without thereby moving beyond the teleology of the ethical.

  35. 35

    When an undertaking that is the concern of a whole people is hindered, when such an enterprise is brought to a standstill by the disfavor of heaven, when the angry deity sends a dead calm that mocks all efforts, when the soothsayer carries out his heavy task and proclaims that the god demands a young girl as a sacrifice — then the father shall heroically bring this sacrifice.

  36. 36

    Magnanimously he shall conceal his pain, even though he might wish he were 'the lowly man who dares to weep,' not the king who must act royally.

  37. 37

    And though the pain pierces lonely into his breast, and though he has but three confidants among the people, soon the whole people shall be confidant of his pain, but also confidant of his deed — that for the good of the whole he would sacrifice her, the daughter, the young and lovely girl.

  38. 38

    O bosom! o fair cheeks, light-golden hair (v. 687).

  39. 39

    And the daughter shall move him with her tears, and the father shall turn his face away, but the hero shall raise the knife.

  40. 40

    — When the tidings of it reach the ancestral home, then the fair maidens of Greece shall flush with enthusiasm, and if the daughter was a bride, then the betrothed shall not grow angry, but be proud to share in the father's deed, because the girl belonged to him more tenderly than she belonged to the father.

  41. 41

    When the valiant judge who saved Israel in the hour of need, in one breath binds God and himself by the same.

  42. 42

    Vow, then he shall heroically transform the young girl's rejoicing, the beloved daughter's joy, into sorrow, and all Israel shall mourn with her over her maidenly youth; but every freeborn man Fear and Trembling.

  43. 43

    shall understand, every stout-hearted woman admire Jephthah, and every maiden in Israel shall wish to act as his daughter did; for what would it have availed that Jephthah triumphed by his vow, if he had not kept it — should not the victory then be taken from the people again?

  44. 44

    When a son forgets his duty, when the state entrusts the father with the sword of judgment, when the laws demand punishment at the father's hand, then the father shall heroically forget that the guilty one is his son, he shall magnanimously hide his pain, but there shall not be a single soul among the people, not even the son, who does not admire the father; and every time the laws of Rome are interpreted, it shall be remembered that many interpreted them more learnedly, but none more gloriously than Brutus.

  45. 45

    If, on the other hand, Agamemnon, while a favorable wind bore the fleet at full sail to its goal, had sent off that messenger to fetch Iphigenia in order to sacrifice her; if Jephthah, without being bound by any vow that decided the people's fate, had said to his daughter: mourn now for two months over your brief youth, then I will sacrifice you; if Brutus had had a righteous son, and yet had called for the lictors to put him to death — who then would have understood them?

  46. 46

    If these three men, to the question why they did it, had answered: it is an ordeal in which we are being tested — would one then have understood them any better?

  47. 47

    When Agamemnon, Jephthah, Brutus at the decisive moment heroically overcome their pain, have heroically lost what they loved and have only to carry out the deed outwardly, then there shall never be a noble soul in the world who has not tears of compassion for their pain, tears of admiration for their deed.

  48. 48

    If, on the other hand, these three men at the decisive moment were to add to the heroism with which they bore their pain the little word: yet it will not happen — who then would understand them?

  49. 49

    If by way of explanation they added: this we believe by virtue of the absurd — who then would understand them better? For who would not easily understand that it was absurd; but who would understand that one could then believe it?

  50. 50

    The difference between the tragic hero and Abraham is easily evident.

  51. 51

    The tragic hero still remains within the ethical.

  52. 52

    He lets one expression of the ethical have its télos in a higher expression of the ethical; he reduces the ethical relation between father and son, or daughter and father, to a feeling that has its dialectic in its relation to the idea of ethical life.

  53. 53

    There can be no question here, then, of a teleological suspension of the ethical itself.

  54. 54

    With Abraham it is otherwise.

  55. 55

    By his deed he overstepped the whole of the ethical, and had a higher télos outside it, in relation to which he suspended it.

  56. 56

    For I should rather like to know how one would bring Abraham's deed into relation with the universal, whether any other point of contact at all could be discovered between what Abraham did and the universal than this: that Abraham transgressed it.

  57. 57

    It is not to save a people, not to assert the idea of the state, that Abraham does it, nor to appease angry gods.

  58. 58

    If there could be any question of the deity being angry, he was angry only with Abraham, and Abraham's whole deed stands in no relation to the universal — it is a purely private undertaking.

  59. 59

    While therefore the tragic hero is great by his ethical virtue, Abraham is great by a purely personal virtue.

  60. 60

    There is no higher expression of the ethical in Abraham's life than this: that the father shall love the son.

  61. 61

    Of the ethical in the sense of ethical life there can be no question at all.

  62. 62

    Insofar as the universal was present, it lay hidden in Isaac, concealed so to speak in Isaac's loins, and would then have had to cry out with Isaac's mouth: Do not do it, you are destroying everything.

  63. 63

    Why, then, does Abraham do it?

  64. 64

    For God's sake, and, wholly identical with this, for his own sake.

  65. 65

    For God's sake he does it, because God demands this proof of his faith; for his own sake he does it, so that he can furnish the proof.

  66. 66

    The unity of this is quite rightly expressed in the word by which this relation has always been designated: it is an ordeal, a temptation.

  67. 67

    A temptation; but what does this mean?

  68. 68

    That which otherwise tempts a person is precisely that which would hold him back from doing his duty, but here the temptation is the ethical itself, which would hold him back from doing God's will.

  69. 69

    But what, then, is duty?

  70. 70

    Duty is precisely the expression of God's will.

  71. 71

    Here the necessity shows itself of a new category in order to understand Abraham.

  72. 72

    Such a relation to the Deity paganism does not know.

  73. 73

    The tragic hero enters into no private relation to the Deity, but the ethical is the divine, and therefore the paradox in it lets itself be mediated in the universal.

  74. 74

    Abraham cannot be mediated, which can also be put thus: he cannot speak.

  75. 75

    As soon as I speak, I express the universal, and when I do not, then no one can understand me.

  76. 76

    As soon, then, as Abraham wants to express himself in the universal, he must say that his situation is a spiritual trial, for he has no higher expression of the universal that stands above the universal he transgresses.

  77. 77

    While Abraham therefore awakens my admiration, he terrifies me at the same time.

  78. 78

    He who denies himself and sacrifices himself for duty gives up the finite in order to grasp the infinite — he is secure enough; the tragic hero gives up the certain for the still more certain, "and the beholder's eye rests securely upon him.

  79. 79

    But he who gives up the universal in order to grasp something still higher that is not the universal — what does he do?

  80. 80

    Is it possible that this can be anything other than a spiritual trial?

  81. 81

    And if it is possible, but the single individual then grasped wrongly, what salvation is there for him?

  82. 82

    He suffers the whole pain of the tragic hero, he annihilates his joy in the world, he renounces everything, and perhaps at the same moment he shuts himself off from the exalted joy that was so dear to him that he would buy it at any price.

  83. 83

    Him the beholder cannot understand at all, nor securely let his eye rest upon him.

  84. 84

    Perhaps what the believer intends cannot be done at all, since it is indeed unthinkable.

  85. 85

    Or if it could be done, supposing the single individual had misunderstood the Deity, what salvation was there then for him?

  86. 86

    The tragic hero, he needs tears and he demands tears, and where was the envious eye so barren that it could not weep with Agamemnon — but where was the one whose soul was so misled that he presumed to weep over Abraham?

  87. 87

    The tragic hero completes his deed in a definite moment of time, but in the course of the ages he does what is no less, he visits the one whose soul is encompassed by sorrow, whose breast cannot draw breath for stifled sighs, whose thoughts hang weighed down over him, heavy with tears; he shows himself to him, he lifts the enchantment of sorrow, he loosens the corset, he coaxes out the tear, as the sufferer forgets his own sufferings in his.

  88. 88

    Abraham one cannot weep over.

  89. 89

    One approaches him with a horror religiosus, as Israel approached Mount Sinai.

  90. 90

    — If, then, the solitary man who climbs Mount Moriah, which with its peak towers heaven-high over the plains of Aulis, if he is not a sleepwalker who walks securely over the abyss while the one who stands at the foot of the mountain and looks on trembles with anxiety, with reverence and dread does not even dare to call out to him — if he becomes deranged within himself, if he had taken the wrong way!

  91. 91

    — Thanks! again thanks! be to a man who reaches out to the one whom life's sorrows overcame and left behind naked, reaches out to him the expression, the leaf of the word, with which he can hide his misery; thanks be to you, great Shakespeare, you who can say everything, everything, everything just as it is — and yet why did you never utter this agony?

  92. 92

    did you reserve it perhaps for yourself?

  93. 93

    like the beloved whose name one cannot even bear to have the world utter; for a poet buys this power of the word to speak out all others' heavy secrets at the cost of one little secret he cannot speak out, and a poet is not an apostle, he casts out devils only by the power of the devil.

  94. 94

    But when the ethical is thus teleologically suspended, how then does the single individual exist in whom it is suspended?

  95. 95

    He exists as the single individual in opposition to the universal.

  96. 96

    Does he sin, then?

  97. 97

    for this is the form of sin, seen in the Idea, so that although the child does not sin, because it is not conscious of its existence as such, yet its existence, seen in the Idea, is sin, and the ethical demands itself of it in every moment.

  98. 98

    If one will deny that this form can be repeated in such a way that it is not sin, then the verdict has been passed on Abraham.

  99. 99

    How, then, did Abraham exist?

  100. 100

    He believed.

  101. 101

    This is the paradox by which he stays at the summit, which he cannot make clear to anyone else, for the paradox is that he, as the single individual, sets himself in an absolute relation to the Absolute.

  102. 102

    Is he justified?

  103. 103

    His justification is again the paradoxical; for if he is justified, he is so not by virtue of being something universal, but by virtue of being the single individual.

  104. 104

    How, then, does the single individual assure himself that he is justified?

  105. 105

    It is easy enough to level the whole of existence onto the Idea of the State or onto an Idea of society.

  106. 106

    If one does that, then one can also mediate easily enough; for then one never comes to the paradox at all, that the single individual as the single individual is higher than the universal, which I can also tellingly express in a saying of Pythagoras, that the odd number is more perfect than the even number.

  107. 107

    Insofar as one occasionally in our time hears an answer in the direction of the paradox, it usually runs thus: one judges that by the outcome.

  108. 108

    A hero who has become a scandal to his age, in the consciousness that he is a paradox who cannot make himself intelligible, confidently calls out to his contemporaries: the outcome will surely prove that I was justified.

  109. 109

    In our time one hears this cry more rarely; for as our age produces no heroes, which is its defect, so it has this good, that it also produces few caricatures.

  110. 110

    When, then, in our time one hears these words: it shall be judged by the outcome, one is at once clear about whom one has the honor of speaking with.

  111. 111

    Those who speak thus are a numerous tribe, whom I will call by one common name: the lecturers.

  112. 112

    They live secured in their thoughts within existence, they have a fixed position and sure prospects in a well-organized State, they have centuries, or indeed even millennia, between themselves and the upheavals of existence, they do not fear that such a thing could be repeated — and what, besides, would the police and the newspapers say?

  113. 113

    Their life's work is to judge the great men, and to judge them by the outcome.

  114. 114

    Such conduct toward greatness betrays a curious mixture of arrogance and wretchedness — arrogance, because one believes oneself called to judge; wretchedness, because one does not feel one's own life in the remotest degree akin to that of the great.

  115. 115

    Anyone who is but a little of a loftier spirit has not become an utterly cold and clammy mollusk, and as he draws near to greatness it can never go out of his mind that, since the creation of the world, it has been the custom and the way that the outcome comes last, and that, when one is truly to learn something from greatness, one must precisely attend to the beginning.

  116. 116

    If the one who is to act will judge himself by the outcome, then he will never come to begin.

  117. 117

    Even though the outcome may delight the whole world, it cannot help the hero; for the outcome he learned only when the whole thing was over, and it was not by that that he became a hero, but he was one by the fact that he began.

  118. 118

    Besides, the outcome (insofar as it is finitude's answer to the infinite question) is in its dialectic utterly incommensurable with the hero's existence.

  119. 119

    Or is the fact that he received Isaac by a miracle supposed to prove that Abraham was justified in relating himself as the single individual to the universal?

  120. 120

    If Abraham had really sacrificed Isaac, would he therefore have been less justified?

  121. 121

    But the outcome one is curious about, as about the ending of a book; of the anxiety, the distress, the paradox one will know nothing.

  122. 122

    With the outcome one flirts aesthetically; it comes just as unexpectedly but also just as easily as a win in the lottery; and when one has heard the outcome, one has been edified.

  123. 123

    And yet no temple-robber laboring in chains and irons is so base a criminal as the one who thus plunders the holy, and yet Judas, who sold his Lord for thirty pieces of silver, is no more contemptible than the one who thus sells greatness.

  124. 124

    It is against my soul to speak inhumanly of greatness, to let it loom in a vast distance in an indefinite shape, to let it be great without yet the human element in it coming forth, whereby it then ceases to be great; for it is not what happens to me that makes me great, but what I do, and surely no one thinks that a man became great because he won the great prize in the lottery.

  125. 125

    Though a man was born in lowly circumstances, I still demand of him that he not be so inhuman toward himself that he could think of the King's castle only at a distance and dream vaguely of its grandeur, and at once want to exalt it and abolish it by exalting it in a base manner; I demand of him that he be human enough to step forward there too, trusting and worthy.

  126. 126

    He shall not be inhuman enough impudently to want to violate everything, by wanting to storm straight from the street into the King's halls — thereby he loses more than the King; on the contrary, he shall find a joy in observing every commandment of decorum with a glad and trusting enthusiasm, which will precisely make him bold.

  127. 127

    This is only an image; for that difference is but a very imperfect expression for the distance of the spirit.

  128. 128

    I demand of every human being that he not think so inhumanly of himself that he dare not step into those palaces where not merely the memory of the chosen ones dwells, but where they themselves dwell.

  129. 129

    He shall not impudently push himself forward and foist his kinship upon them, he shall be blissful each time he bows before them, but he shall be bold and trusting and always be something more than a charwoman; for if he will not be more, then he will never get in there.

  130. 130

    And what shall help him is precisely the anxiety and the distress in which the great are tried, for otherwise these — if he has a little marrow in him — would merely awaken his righteous envy.

  131. 131

    And whatever can be great only at a distance, whatever one would make into something great by the help of empty and hollowed-out phrases, one oneself annihilates it.

  132. 132

    Who was great in the world like that favored woman, the Mother of God, the Virgin Mary?

  133. 133

    And yet how does one speak of it?

  134. 134

    That she was the favored one among women does not make her great, and if it did not happen so strangely that those who hear can think just as inhumanly as those who speak, then surely every young girl would have to ask: why did I not also become the favored one?

  135. 135

    and if I had nothing else to say, I should not at all dismiss such a question as stupid; for in the face of a favor, regarded abstractly, every human being is equally entitled.

  136. 136

    One leaves out the distress, the anxiety, the paradox.

  137. 137

    My thought is pure, in defiance of anyone's, and he who can think such things, his thought will surely be pure, and he also has the dreadful to expect if it is not so; for he who has once brought these images forth can never be rid of them again, and if he sins against them, they avenge themselves frightfully with silent wrath, more frightfully than the loud-voicedness of ten ravening reviewers.

  138. 138

    True, Mary bore the child miraculously, but it went with her nonetheless in the manner of women, and this time is the time of anxiety, distress, and paradox.

  139. 139

    The angel was indeed a ministering spirit, but he was not an obliging spirit who went to the other young girls in Israel and said: do not despise Mary, to her the extraordinary is happening.

  140. 140

    But the angel came only to Mary, and no one could understand her.

  141. 141

    What woman was ever so wronged as Mary, and is it not also true here that the one whom God blesses, he curses in the same breath?

  142. 142

    This is the spirit's conception of Mary, and she is by no means — what it outrages me to say, but still more that one has thoughtlessly and trivially conceived her so — she is by no means a lady who sits in her finery and plays with a divine child.

  143. 143

    When she nonetheless said: behold, I am the handmaid of the Lord, then she is great, and I think it shall not prove difficult to explain why she became the Mother of God.

  144. 144

    She needs no worldly admiration, just as little as Abraham needs tears, for she was no heroine and he no hero, but the two of them became by no means greater than these by being exempted from the distress and the agony and the paradox, but became so through these.

  145. 145

    It is great when the poet, as he sets his tragic hero before the admiration of men, then dares to say: weep over him, for he deserves it; for it is great to deserve the tears of those who deserve to shed tears; it is great that the poet dares to hold the crowd in check, dares to chasten men, that each one tests himself whether he is worthy to weep over the hero, for the slop-water of blubberers is a degradation of the holy.

  146. 146

    — Yet greater than all this is it that the knight of faith dares to say even to the noble man who would weep over him: weep not over me, but weep over yourself.

  147. 147

    One is moved, one seeks back into those beautiful times, sweet tender longings lead one to the goal of one's wish: to see Christ walking about in the promised land.

  148. 148

    One forgets the anxiety, the distress, the paradox.

  149. 149

    Was it so easy a matter not to be mistaken?

  150. 150

    Was it not dreadful that this human being who walked among the others — that he was God; was it not dreadful to sit at table with him?

  151. 151

    Was it so easy a matter to become an apostle?

  152. 152

    But the outcome, eighteen centuries — that helps; it helps toward this contemptible deceit by which one deceives oneself and others.

  153. 153

    I do not feel the courage to wish to be a contemporary of such events, but for that reason I do not judge harshly those who erred, nor lightly those who saw what was right.

  154. 154

    But I return to Abraham.

  155. 155

    In the time before the outcome, Abraham was either, in every minute, a murderer, or we stand at the paradox that is higher than all mediations.

  156. 156

    Abraham's story, then, contains a teleological suspension of the ethical.

  157. 157

    He has, as the single individual, become higher than the universal.

  158. 158

    This is the paradox, which does not let itself be mediated.

  159. 159

    It is just as inexplicable how he entered into it as it is inexplicable how he remains in it.

  160. 160

    If this is not how it stands with Abraham, then he is not even a tragic hero, but a murderer.

  161. 161

    To go on wanting to call him the father of faith, to speak of it to people who care for nothing but words, is thoughtless.

  162. 162

    A tragic hero a person can become by his own powers, but a knight of faith he cannot.

  163. 163

    When a person sets out on the tragic hero's in a certain sense burdensome path, then many will be able to counsel him; but the one who walks faith's narrow way — him no one can counsel, no one understand.

  164. 164

    Faith is a marvel, and yet no human being is excluded from it; for that in which all human life is united is passion, and faith is a passion.

  165. 165

    Lessing has somewhere expressed something similar from a purely aesthetic standpoint.

  166. 166

    His real aim in that passage is to show that grief, too, can give itself a witty expression.

  167. 167

    To that end he cites a line, in a particular situation, of the unhappy English king Edward the Second.

  168. 168

    In contrast to it he cites, after Diderot, a story about a peasant woman and a line of hers.

  169. 169

    Now he goes on: That too was wit, and what is more, the wit of a bathhouse keeper; but the circumstances made it inevitable.

  170. 170

    And consequently one must not seek the excuse for the witty expressions of pain and grief in the fact that the person who utters them is a distinguished, well-bred, sensible, and otherwise witty person — for the passions make all people alike again — but rather in the fact that, in all probability, every person without distinction would say the same thing in the same circumstances.

  171. 171

    The peasant woman's thought a queen could have had and must have had — just as that which the king says there a peasant too could have said and without doubt would have said.

  172. 172

    Cf. Complete Works, vol. 30, p. 293.

The particulars

The text
Frygt og Bæven, Søren Kierkegaard. Problemata.
Translation
Public-domain Danish (Kierkegaard, d. 1855; published 1843). English translation © 2026 1732 Studios, LLC.
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Two whoopie pies and a pine. An inside joke.